Module 06 — System Hacking · Must-Know Facts¶
One-page, high-yield recall sheet. If you can reproduce this from memory, you own the module. Pairs with README.md · practice-questions.md · flashcards.csv · lab-walkthrough.md.
The methodology (in order)¶
Gaining Access → Privilege Escalation → Maintaining Access → Clearing Logs. Cracking/guessing is gaining access; log clearing is anti-forensics, the last phase — not privesc.
Password attack taxonomy¶
| Category | What | Tool |
|---|---|---|
| Passive online | Sniff on the wire | Wireshark, Responder |
| Active online | Guess a live service | Hydra, Medusa, NetExec |
| Offline | Crack captured hashes | Hashcat, John |
| Non-electronic | Shoulder-surf, dumpster, social | — |
Strategies: dictionary · brute force · hybrid · rule-based · rainbow table.
Windows credential stores¶
| Store | Holds | Attack |
|---|---|---|
| SAM | Local NT hashes | Dump with SYSTEM |
| LSASS (memory) | Logged-on creds, tickets | Mimikatz sekurlsa |
| NTDS.dit (DC) | All domain hashes | DCSync, VSS |
| LSA secrets | Service-acct passwords | secretsdump |
Hash & ticket attacks — does it need cracking?¶
| Attack | Abuses | Crack? |
|---|---|---|
| Pass-the-Hash | NT hash used directly | No |
| Pass-the-Ticket | Reuse TGT/TGS | No |
| Kerberoasting | TGS for an SPN, crack the service-account password offline | Yes |
| AS-REP roasting | Accounts with preauth disabled | Yes |
| Golden ticket | Forged TGT signed with krbtgt hash | No (post-compromise) |
| Silver ticket | Forged TGS signed with the service account key | No |
Numbers to memorize¶
- Hashcat modes:
0MD5 ·100SHA1 ·1000NTLM ·1800sha512crypt ·5600NetNTLMv2 ·13100Kerberos TGS-REP ·22000WPA. - Kerberos encryption type on the wire: RC4 =
0x17(the Kerberoasting tell). - Key event IDs:
4624logon ·4625failed logon ·4768TGT ·4769TGS ·4662replication (DCSync) ·4672special privileges ·1102log cleared.
Rainbow tables vs. salt¶
Rainbow table = precomputed hash→plaintext lookup. Salt defeats it (per-hash randomness kills precomputation). NTLM is unsalted → still crackable → why Kerberoasting works.
Privilege escalation quick hits¶
- Windows: unquoted service paths, weak service perms,
AlwaysInstallElevated, DLL hijacking, token impersonation, kernel exploits. - Linux:
sudo -l, SUID binaries (find / -perm -4000), writable cron, PATH abuse, kernel exploits. - Vertical = gain higher privilege; horizontal = same level, different user.
Anti-forensics (Maintaining/Clearing phase)¶
- Windows log clear:
wevtutil cl <log>/Clear-EventLog(→ event1102). - NTFS Alternate Data Streams hide data:
file.txt:hidden.exe. - Steganography hides data in media; rootkits hide presence (user/kernel/boot/firmware).
The one-line PAM answer key¶
- Kerberoasting → gMSA / CPM-rotated long random service password (AES-only).
- PtH/PtT → tiering + Protected Users + Credential Guard + LAPS, sessions brokered so creds never hit the endpoint.
- LSASS dumping → Credential Guard + EPM credential-theft protection.
- DCSync → restrict replication rights to DCs, Tier 0 isolation, rotate krbtgt twice after compromise.
- Local-admin reuse → LAPS (unique per host).
Top traps¶
- "Crack" in the question ⇒ not PtH (PtH needs no cracking).
- Kerberoasting cracks the service account password, not the user's.
- Golden = krbtgt; Silver = service key. Don't swap them.
- Salting stops rainbow tables, not brute force.