Networking and Protocols for PAM¶
A Privileged Access Management (PAM) broker like WALLIX Bastion lives in the network between administrators and targets. It either proxies a protocol (SSH, RDP, VNC, Telnet…) or relies on a protocol for authentication, federation, or logging (LDAP, RADIUS, SAML, Syslog…). To configure and troubleshoot Bastion you must know what each protocol is for, which TCP/UDP port it uses, and where it shows up in WALLIX. This file gives you that map, then walks through three authentication flows you will meet constantly: SAML 2.0 SSO, OpenID Connect (OIDC) authorization-code, and RADIUS.
Port reminder: A port is a 16-bit number identifying a service on a host; TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) is connection-oriented, UDP (User Datagram Protocol) is connectionless. Defaults below can be changed, but exam questions assume the standard ports.
Learning objectives¶
By the end of this file you should be able to:
- Name each PAM-relevant protocol, its purpose, default port(s), and where it appears in WALLIX (one big reference table).
- Distinguish session protocols (proxied by Bastion) from infrastructure protocols (auth/federation/logging Bastion relies on).
- Walk through the SAML 2.0 SSO, OIDC authorization-code, and RADIUS authentication flows.
See ../reference/acronyms.md, cryptography-and-pki.md (TLS, certificates), and windows-and-active-directory.md (Kerberos, LDAP, RDP).
1. The master protocol table¶
| Protocol | Expands to | Purpose | Default port(s) | Transport | Where in WALLIX |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SSH | Secure Shell | Encrypted CLI / file transfer / tunnelling | 22 | TCP | Bastion session proxy (shell, SCP, SFTP, X11, direct-TCPIP sub-protocols); OT protocol encapsulation |
| RDP | Remote Desktop Protocol | Graphical Windows remote desktop | 3389 | TCP | Bastion session proxy via the "Redemption" engine (NLA, Kerberos, TLS) |
| VNC | Virtual Network Computing | Graphical remote desktop (cross-platform) | 5900 | TCP | Bastion session proxy; session-invite (guest) supported for VNC |
| Telnet | Teletype Network | Plaintext remote CLI (legacy) | 23 | TCP | Bastion session proxy (legacy/OT devices) |
| RLOGIN | Remote Login | Plaintext UNIX remote login (legacy) | 513 | TCP | Bastion session proxy (legacy) |
| TLS/SSL | Transport Layer Security / Secure Sockets Layer | Encrypts other protocols (HTTPS = HTTP over TLS) | 443 (HTTPS) | TCP | Bastion admin GUI & REST API; Access Manager HTTPS gateway; protects LDAPS, RDP, etc. |
| LDAP | Lightweight Directory Access Protocol | Directory queries / authentication (AD) | 389 | TCP | Bastion + Access Manager user authentication against AD/LDAP |
| LDAPS | LDAP over TLS | Encrypted LDAP | 636 | TCP | Same as LDAP, encrypted (recommended) |
| RADIUS | Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service | Centralized AAA / often the MFA second factor | 1812 (auth), 1813 (acct) | UDP | Bastion + Access Manager auth domain; MFA via RADIUS (e.g., Trustelem) |
| TACACS+ | Terminal Access Controller Access-Control System Plus | AAA for network devices (Cisco) | 49 | TCP | Bastion directory/authentication integration |
| Kerberos | (named after the 3-headed dog) | Ticket-based SSO authentication | 88 | TCP/UDP | Bastion user auth and target auth; RDP Kerberos (default from 12.0.1) |
| SAML 2.0 | Security Assertion Markup Language | Browser SSO / identity federation (XML) | 443 (over HTTPS) | TCP | Access Manager as SAML Service Provider; Trustelem as IdP |
| OIDC / OAuth 2.0 | OpenID Connect / Open Authorization | Modern SSO (OIDC) on top of authorization (OAuth 2.0); JSON/JWT | 443 (over HTTPS) | TCP | Access Manager auth domain (OIDC Authorization Code Flow) |
| SCIM | System for Cross-domain Identity Management | Automated user/group provisioning (JSON/REST) | 443 (over HTTPS) | TCP | Trustelem acts as SCIM client to provision downstream apps |
| SNMP | Simple Network Management Protocol | Device monitoring / metrics / traps | 161 (162 traps) | UDP | Bastion monitoring (v2c/v3) |
| Syslog | System Logging Protocol | Event/log forwarding to a SIEM | 514 | UDP (often TCP) | Bastion log forwarding via syslog-ng to a SIEM |
Two families to keep straight¶
flowchart TD
subgraph SESSION["SESSION protocols —<br/>Bastion PROXIES the<br/>live connection"]
S1["SSH (22) · RDP (3389) · VNC (5900) ·<br/>Telnet (23) · RLOGIN (513)"]
S2["→ recorded, credential-injected,<br/>sub-protocol controlled"]
S1 --- S2
end
subgraph INFRA["INFRASTRUCTURE protocols — Bastion<br/>RELIES on these around the session"]
I1["Auth / federation:<br/>LDAP (389/636) · RADIUS<br/>(1812) · TACACS+<br/>(49) · Kerberos (88) · SAML ·<br/>OIDC/OAuth2 · SCIM"]
I2["Transport: TLS/SSL (443)"]
I3["Ops / audit: SNMP<br/>(161) · Syslog (514)"]
end
SESSION --- INFRA
AAA = Authentication (who are you?), Authorization (what may you do?), Accounting (what did you do?). RADIUS and TACACS+ are the classic AAA protocols.
2. FLOW: SAML 2.0 — Single Sign-On¶
SAML 2.0 (Security Assertion Markup Language) is an XML-based standard for browser SSO and identity federation. Three roles:
- Principal — the user (in a web browser).
- Service Provider (SP) — the app the user wants (here, WALLIX Access Manager).
- Identity Provider (IdP) — who authenticates the user (e.g., WALLIX Trustelem, Microsoft Entra ID, Okta).
This is the SP-initiated flow (user starts at the app):
sequenceDiagram
participant B as Browser (user)
participant SP as Service Provider<br/>(WALLIX Access Manager)
participant IdP as Identity Provider<br/>(e.g. Trustelem)
B->>SP: (1) GET protected resource
SP->>B: (2) 302 redirect + SAML AuthnReq
B->>IdP: (3) follow redirect (SAML AuthnRequest) to IdP
B<<->>IdP: (4) login + MFA at the IdP
IdP->>B: (5) 200 page with signed SAML Assertion (auto-POSTs back)
B->>SP: (6) POST SAML Assertion
Note over SP: (7) verify IdP signature,<br/>read identity + attributes
SP->>B: (8) access granted (session)
Walk-through: the SP bounces the unauthenticated user to the IdP with a signed AuthnRequest (1–3); the user authenticates (and does MFA) at the IdP (4); the IdP returns a signed SAML Assertion that the browser POSTs to the SP (5–6); the SP verifies the IdP's signature and logs the user in (7–8). The SP never sees the password.
Bastion tie-in: Access Manager acts as the SAML Service Provider (both SP- and IdP-initiated), trusting IdPs like Trustelem/ADFS/Entra. Per the product portfolio, FIDO2/OTP/push are not native to WAM — they arrive via the federated IdP over SAML/OIDC.
3. FLOW: OpenID Connect (OIDC) — Authorization Code Flow¶
OAuth 2.0 is an authorization framework (delegated access via tokens). OpenID Connect (OIDC) adds an authentication layer on top, returning an ID Token (a signed JWT — JSON Web Token) that proves who the user is. The recommended flow is the Authorization Code Flow:
- Resource Owner — the user.
- Client / Relying Party (RP) — the app (here, WALLIX Access Manager).
- Authorization Server / OpenID Provider (OP) — the IdP.
sequenceDiagram
participant B as Browser (user)
participant RP as Client / RP<br/>(WALLIX Access Manager)
participant OP as Authorization Server / OP<br/>(IdP)
B->>RP: (1) click "Log in"
RP->>B: (2) 302 -> /authorize?response_type=code&client_id=...&scope=openid
B->>OP: (3) GET /authorize (login + consent at the OP)
B<<->>OP: (3) authenticate
OP->>B: (4) 302 redirect back with ?code=AUTH_CODE
B->>RP: (5) GET redirect_uri?code=...
RP->>OP: (6) POST /token back-channel<br/>code + client_secret
OP->>RP: (7) ID Token (JWT) + Access Token returned
RP->>B: (8) logged in (RP validates ID Token signature)
Why the code, not the token, comes back through the browser: the short-lived
authorization code (4–5) is exchanged for tokens over a back-channel server-to-
server call (6–7) authenticated with the client_secret, so the tokens never pass
through the user's browser. The RP then validates the ID Token's signature (8).
Bastion tie-in: Access Manager supports OIDC (Authorization Code Flow) as an authentication-domain type (per the product portfolio).
4. FLOW: RADIUS authentication (often the MFA second factor)¶
RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service) is a UDP-based AAA protocol (auth on UDP 1812). In PAM it is the classic way to plug in a second factor:
- NAS (Network Access Server) / RADIUS client — here, WALLIX Bastion or Access Manager.
- RADIUS server — the AAA/MFA service (e.g., Trustelem, an OTP server).
sequenceDiagram
participant U as User
participant RC as RADIUS Client<br/>(WALLIX Bastion / Access Manager)
participant RS as RADIUS Server<br/>(MFA / AAA)
U->>RC: (1) username + password + OTP (optional)
RC->>RS: (2) Access-Request (UDP 1812, shared secret)
Note over RS: (3) check creds / OTP / push
RS->>RC: (4a) Access-Challenge ("enter your OTP")
U->>RC: (4b) OTP
RC->>RS: (4b) Access-Request again
RS->>RC: (5) Access-Accept (or Access-Reject)
RC->>U: (6) logged in / denied
Walk-through: the client wraps the user's credentials in an Access-Request
secured by a shared secret (2). The server may answer Access-Challenge to demand
an OTP (4a/4b), then finally Access-Accept or Access-Reject (5). Accounting
(Access-Request on 1813) optionally logs the session.
Bastion tie-in: Bastion and Access Manager both support RADIUS auth domains; WALLIX Trustelem integrates with Bastion via LDAP/RADIUS to deliver MFA. Note RADIUS typically carries PAP and is used as a "2nd factor only" mechanism in the Trustelem integration (per the product portfolio).
How this maps to the certifications¶
- WCA-P / WCP-P: SSH, RDP, and proxy concepts are stated prerequisites; you will configure session protocols and LDAP/RADIUS auth.
- WCE-P (Expert): the Advanced authentication module covers RADIUS, Kerberos, X.509, and SAML directly (see wce-p-expert.md); SAML/OIDC are central to Access Manager. The IDaaS track adds SCIM, SAML, OIDC/OAuth 2.0 (see ewcp-i-professional.md).
Sources¶
- RFC 4251 / 4252 — SSH protocol & authentication: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4251 · https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4252
- Microsoft — Remote Desktop Protocol: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/termserv/remote-desktop-protocol
- RFC 4120 — Kerberos V5: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4120
- RFC 4511 — LDAP (the protocol): https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4511
- RFC 2865 — RADIUS: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2865
- RFC 8907 — TACACS+: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8907
- RFC 8446 — TLS 1.3: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446
- OASIS — SAML 2.0 specifications: http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/
- RFC 6749 — OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749
- OpenID Connect Core 1.0: https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html
- RFC 7644 — SCIM 2.0 Protocol: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7644
- RFC 5424 — The Syslog Protocol: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5424
- RFC 3416 — SNMPv2 protocol operations: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3416
- IANA Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry: https://www.iana.org/assignments/service-names-port-numbers/service-names-port-numbers.xhtml
- WALLIX Bastion / Access Manager / Trustelem protocol support: product-portfolio.md